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I. INTRODUCTION
The Constitution was intended to be an agreement made by the
people to govern themselves.1 The Framers eschewed what they con-
sidered tyranny: a government shrouded in secrecy.2 In what was con-
sidered a radical experiment, the Framers, through the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights, constructed an open political process rooted in
democratic theory.3 One leading First Amendment theorist stated,
“public discussions of public issues, together with the spreading of in-
formation and opinion bearing on those issues, must have a freedom
unabridged,” and “though they govern us, we, in a deeper sense, gov-
ern them. Over our governing, they have no power. Over their gov-
erning we have sovereign power.”4
For the first time in history, political theorists recognized that the
electoral process was intimately linked to free expression.5 Freedom of
speech imparts information to the electorate, which allows the people
to wisely choose their representatives.6 Popular government requires
popular information, and freedom of expression—the “principal pillar
in a free government”—is the means to achieve these indispensable
1. Chief Justice John Jay, one of the authors of the Federalist Papers, observed in
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793) that “the Constitution of the United
States is . . . [a] compact made by the people of the United States in order to
govern themselves.” LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 231 (1985).
2. “The generation that made the nation thought secrecy in government [was] one of
the instruments of Old World tyranny and committed itself to the principle that a
democracy cannot function unless the people are permitted to know what the gov-
ernment is up to.” Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 105 (1973) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (quoting Henry Steels Commager).
3. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs and Scapegoats: The Press and Na-
tional Security Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233, 238 (2008).
4. Id.
5. LEVY, supra note 1, at 134.
6. William Bollin and James Alexander, colonial theorists, “stressed the necessity
and right of the people to be informed of the conduct of their governors so as to
shape their own judgment on ‘Publick Matters’ . . . ” creating a clear relationship
between freedom of expression and elections. LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUP-
PRESSION 137–38 (1960).
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ends.7 Freedom of the press was intended to fulfill this specialized
role; the freedom to publish using the printing press would ensure a
popular government by informing the voters of a candidate’s positions
and record.8 The “great bulwark of liberty”9 was intended to be com-
pletely protected from regulation, as the federal government could ex-
ercise only enumerated powers.10
However, over two centuries later, there is still government control
over the press—it has simply evolved. In 1946, President Harry S.
Truman issued an executive order creating a uniform system of classi-
fication within the Executive Branch.11 The categories of classification
were subsequently expanded to “top secret,” “secret,” “confidential,”
and “restricted.”12 The power of the Executive Branch to classify docu-
ments and the scope of what can be classified has ebbed and flowed
through different administrations.13 While overt censorship, licens-
ing, and taxing are no longer utilized to muzzle the press, unelected
bureaucrats exploit the classification system to prohibit information
from reaching the public sphere. Rather than freely disseminating
government information to the polity, the prevailing attitude became
“when in doubt, classify.”14 In the past, information was readily avail-
able, but freedom to express opinions was not yet secured. Now, there
is essentially unqualified protection for opinions, but information is
not so easily accessible.
The foundation of the Press Clause is a prohibition on prior re-
straints, which are restrictions on speech before its publication.15 In
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson,16 the Supreme Court made clear that
under the First Amendment the government cannot censor publica-
tions through the use of prior restraints.17 Beginning shortly thereaf-
ter, and escalating at a frightening pace since, the Executive Branch
7. James Alexander described free expression as “a principal pillar in a free govern-
ment” and argued “the Constitution is dissolved,” and tyranny is erected in its
ruins if it is suppressed. JEFFREY ALLEN SMITH, WAR AND PRESS FREEDOM 28
(1999).
8. The Framers quickly realized that the existence of a free state as well as individ-
ual liberties depended in large part on the freedom and vigilance of the press.
LEVY, supra note 1, at 273.
9. Id. at 251.
10. Id. at 270. All other unenumerated rights are reserved to the states or to the
people by the Tenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
11. Exec. Order No. 9784, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,909 (Sept. 25, 1946).
12. Exec. Order No. 10,104, 15 Fed. Reg. 597, 598 (Feb. 1, 1950).
13. See Austin Harris, Square Information, Round Categorization: Executive Order
13556 and Its Implementation Challenges, 1 U. MIAMI NAT’L SEC. & ARMED CON-
FLICT L. REV. 165 (2011).
14. BRUCE LADD, CRISIS IN CREDIBILITY 188 (1968).
15. Prior Restraint, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
16. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
17. Id. at 713 (“[T]he operation and effect of the statute in substance” is the “essence
of censorship.”).
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has avoided the prohibition on direct prior restraints by wielding the
classification system to stifle information at the source.18
Justice Stewart, in his 1971 concurring opinion in the Pentagon
Papers case, wrote, “[f]or when everything is classified, then nothing is
classified, and the system becomes one . . . to be manipulated by those
intent on self-protection or self-promotion.”19 Almost fifty years later,
even in the world of the 24/7 news cycle, the American electorate has
been largely cut off from information needed to fulfill its constitutional
role of self-government due to the Executive Branch’s culture of
classification.
There are two consequences when government restricts access to
information. First, the American electorate does not have the requisite
information necessary to make enlightened decisions at the polls.
When the Executive Branch has virtually unbridled power to classify,
suppress, and withhold information, such power all but extinguishes
the fundamental constitutional check: governing by the consent of the
governed.20 This “paper curtain” has created a direct barrier between
a purportedly representative government and the people it
represents.21
The second consequence of restricted access to information is the
ability of government officials to shape public debate and, thus, policy
through selectively leaking the information favorable to their posi-
tion.22 Walter Lippman once wrote, “men who have lost their grip
upon the relevant facts of their environment are the inevitable victims
of agitation and propaganda. The quack, the charlatan, the jingo and
the terrorist can flourish only where the audience is deprived of inde-
pendent access to information.”23 By only publicizing information on
one side of the debate, government officials are able to put their
thumb on the scale of political discourse.
18. SAM LEBOVIC, FREE PRESS AND UNFREE NEWS 132 (2016).
19. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
20. Information is required for our governmental system to properly function; with-
out it, the balance of power is redistributed. Wallace Parks, The Open Govern-
ment Principle, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1957).
21. Id. at 6. In 1956, the House Government Information Subcommittee stated
“Slowly, almost imperceptibly, a paper curtain has descended over the Federal
Government. Behind this curtain lies an attitude novel to democratic govern-
ment—an attitude which says that we, the officials, not you, the people, will de-
termine how much you are to be told about your own government.” H.R. Rep. No.
86-2947 (1956).
22. See Genevra Kay Loveland, Newsgathering: Second-Class Right Among First
Amendment Freedoms, 53 TEX. L. REV. 1440, 1466 (1975) (“In recent years, the
government has increasingly used its control over access to information about its
activities to disseminate—through selective leaking, backgrounders, deep back-
grounders, and other methods—only information favorable to the government’s
position.”).
23. WALTER LIPPMAN, LIBERTY AND THE NEWS 54 (1920).
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While the First Amendment affords the press nearly complete au-
tonomy to publish information, it affords virtually no protection to the
press for newsgathering—creating a dichotomy between publication
and newsgathering.24 But the connection between gathering and pub-
lishing is self-evident: before one can publish information, one must
gather information. The Supreme Court has stated in dicta that “with-
out some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press
could be eviscerated.”25 Yet, the current jurisprudence of the Court
declines to recognize the connection between gathering and publish-
ing, essentially holding that gathering is sufficiently “prior” to publi-
cation to permit restraints.26 However, the right of the press to
publish information is unavoidably impeded when the government in-
hibits the ability to gather information, which in turn prevents the
electorate from intelligent self-government.
In order to give full effect to the First Amendment, newsgathering
must be given some limited protection. This Comment begins from an
originalist perspective of freedom of the press, then seeks to apply the
underlying principles to current issues involving newsgathering in or-
der to facilitate a revival of the Press Clause.27 Part II will begin by
examining the purpose and role of the First Amendment’s Press
Clause. It will then trace the current jurisprudence on newsgathering
and provide an overview of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).28
Part III will begin by delineating a broad interpretation of the First
Amendment that encompasses corollary rights. It will then argue for a
limited right to gather information under the First Amendment
grounded on three current First Amendment doctrines: (1) restrictions
against prior restraints; (2) protection for conduct necessary for ex-
pression; and (3) a structural model of the Press Clause which fosters
intelligent self-government. Finally, it will discuss why the current
protection under the FOIA is insufficient.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Purpose and Role of the First Amendment
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press . . . .”29 As simple as these words appear, their meaning
24. Steven Helle, The News-Gathering/Publication Dichotomy and Government Ex-
pression, 1982 DUKE L.J. 1, 40 (1982).
25. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
26. Helle, supra note 24, at 42.
27. Leonard W. Levy, On the Origins of the Free Press Clause, 32 UCLA L. REV. 177,
180 (1984) (stating the “principles—not the Framers’ understanding and applica-
tion of them—were meant to endure”).
28. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 2016).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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was not expressly manifested at the time of adoption.30 Alexander
Hamilton in Federalist No. 84 wrote, “who can give [freedom of the
press] any definition which would not leave the utmost latitude for
evasion?”31 James Madison’s original proposal stated, “the people
shall not be deprived or abridged of the right to speak, to write, or to
publish their sentiments; and freedom of the press, one of the great
bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.”32
The Press Clause has often been treated as a redundancy of the
Speech Clause, but the two clauses protect different methods of ex-
pression.33 The Speech Clause safeguards the right to speak, whereas
the Press Clause was originally intended to protect the freedom to use
the printing press as a vehicle for promoting a popular government.34
The freedom of the “press” occupied a “preferred position” under the
Constitution,35 not because the press as an institution was distinctive,
but because the power of the printing press ensured that anyone could
publish their insights on government.36
The Supreme Court has treated the Press Clause as mere “consti-
tutional window dressing.”37 However, the Framers’ primary concern
was freedom of the press, with freedom of speech being ancillary.38
The four foundational purposes of the Press Clause include (1) free-
dom from prior restraints; (2) protecting the “functional” role of the
press; (3) providing a conduit for self-government through the discov-
ery of truth; and (4) creating a check on governmental power through
the “Fourth Estate.”
30. LEVY, supra note 1, at 266. In fact, most of the Framers were not particularly
passionate about creating a Bill of Rights as the argument for enshrining individ-
ual liberties originated from the Anti-Federalists. Id. However, the Federalists,
at James Madison’s insistence, eventually agreed to frame and ratify the Bill of
Rights in order to “give great quiet” to the people. Id.
31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 434 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
32. LEVY, supra note 1, at 251. A clear difference between the first version of the
First Amendment and the adopted language is the addition of the word “Con-
gress,” which specifically curbed federal legislative authority over freedom of ex-
pression. The prohibition was limited to Congress because the Executive Branch
was intended to be less powerful and thus less threatening. However, it is now
well established that the First Amendment is applied to the exercise of presiden-
tial as well as legislative power and applies to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Parks, supra note 20, at 8–9.
33. Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1033 (2011).
34. LEVY, supra note 1, at 273.
35. Id.
36. The word “press” has dual significance as both an institution that disseminates
content and a technology for creating and distributing content. At the time of the
ratification of the First Amendment, the freedom of the “press” referred to the use
of the technology of the day—the printing press. See Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/
New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296, 2302 (2014).
37. West, supra note 33, at 1033.
38. David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 533
(1983).
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The First Amendment was designed to provide complete freedom
from censorship through the use of “prior restraints.”39 Prior re-
straints at their core are governmental orders or actions which pro-
hibit the publication or broadcast of information before it is
published.40 The Blackstonian view of press freedom, which ripened
under the milieu of suppression in England and the colonies during
the use of licensing and taxing, was limited to liberty from any form of
prior restraint.41 In other words, “freedom of the press” meant that a
message could not be muzzled prior to publishing, however, there was
no protection from the government punishing the speaker after
publication.
Suppressing speech prior to publication was considered a more
dangerous affront to freedom of the press than punishing a speaker
following publication.42 In a regime of subsequent punishments, at
least the message was disseminated, whereas it never reached the
marketplace of ideas if a prior restraint was utilized.43 This was the
primary concern of libertarian political thought leading up to the
Revolution.44 After the Constitution was ratified, the fear was that
enumerated powers, such as the power to tax, could be manipulated to
stifle freedom of expression and prevent publication of information.45
The absence of prior restraints was understood to preserve un-
restricted liberty to write or publish, especially on topics concerning
government.46
While the newly freed colonies understood the absence of prior re-
straints to be a critical component of press freedom, it was not consid-
39. See Tom A. Collins, Press Clause Construed in Context: The Journalists’ Right of
Access to Places, 52 MO. L. REV. 751, 758 (1987) (stating the text and historical
analysis of the amendment provides strong evidence that it was intended to pro-
tect against prior restraints, while also emphasizing that printed speech was to
be given specific and special protection).
40. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556 (1976). The Blackstonian view of
press freedom prohibited the government from censoring speech prior to publica-
tion, but provided no shield against government punishment after publication.
ZACHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (1941).
41. See Karen L. Turner, Convergence of the First Amendment and the Withholding of
Information for the Security of the Nation: A Historical Perspective and the Effect
of September 11th on Constitutional Freedoms, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 593, 595
(2002). The English government claimed that the right to control any printed
material and publications were subject to review and censorship prior to printing.
However, licensing ended in England in 1695 and in colonial America by 1725. Id.
at 597.
42. Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
648, 660 (1955).
43. Id. at 657.
44. LEVY, supra note 1, at 65.
45. Id. at 231. Richard Henry Lee observed that the enumerated power to tax could
be exerted to “destroy or restrain the freedom” of the press. Id.
46. Id. at 191.
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ered the only limitation on government action against the press.
Blackstone’s explanation of press freedom described the current state
of English law, but the Framers of the First Amendment had a more
expansive interpretation in mind.47 Judge Cooley explained that true
freedom of the press required a broader interpretation which pro-
tected against both prior restraints and subsequent punishment in or-
der to guard against repressive actions of government. He wrote,
“[t]he evils to be prevented were not the censorship of the press
merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might
prevent such free and general discussion of public matters . . . .”48
Thus, the First Amendment’s scope begins with freedom from previ-
ous restraints, but does not end there.
Since the twentieth century, there has been substantial disagree-
ment over whether the Press Clause was originally intended to apply
to or protect “the press” as an institution. It is evident from the history
surrounding ratification that the First Amendment was intended to
protect the functional role of the press, guaranteeing that anyone had
the freedom to publish their sentiments.49 The Framers recognized
the importance of using the printing press to publish and widely dis-
seminate information, which facilitated popular government.50 They
believed the press fulfilled the function of informing the electorate,
and “the electoral process would’ve been a sham if voters did not have
the assistance of the press in learning what the candidate stood for
and what the record showed about past performance and qualifica-
tions.”51 The Supreme Court has “consistently rejected the proposition
that the institutional press has any constitutional privilege beyond
that of other speakers.”52 However, the Court has emphasized protec-
tion for the functional role of the press, arguing in Lovell v. City of
Griffin53 that “the press in its historic connotation comprehends every
sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opin-
ion.”54 Thus, the functional press includes newspapers, books,
47. CHAFEE JR., supra note 40, at 9.
48. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION, 886
(8th ed. 1868).
49. Amy Jordan, The Right of Access: Is There a Better Fit Than the First Amend-
ment?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1349, 1360–61 (2004). The First Amendment allows the
press to act as a vehicle for information which in turn educates and informs the
polity. Id. at 1362.
50. Id. at 1368.
51. LEVY, supra note 1, at 213.
52. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010) (quoting Aus-
tin v. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 691 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
53. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
54. Id. at 452. Freedom of the Press refers to the “freedom of the people to publish
their views, rather than the freedom of journalists to pursue their craft.” David A.
Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 446–47 (2002).
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magazines, pamphlets and virtually any other medium for dissemi-
nating information or news to the public.55
Another fundamental purpose of the Press Clause is to facilitate
self-government through the discovery of truth. Recognizing that men
are only free when they are self-governed, the Framers utilized the
Press Clause to prevent government from interfering with any com-
munications so the people could fully exercise their rights as citi-
zens.56 The printing press was a conduit for self-governance; the
people could both inform fellow citizens about important governmen-
tal matters and try to persuade them.57 Therefore, the objective of the
Press Clause is to ensure that “no opinion, no doubt, no belief, no
counter-belief, no relevant information” may be kept from the electo-
rate.58 If all “relevant information” is published, then the marketplace
of ideas will produce truth, democracy, and civic virtue.59 However,
truth will only emerge when governmental policies and officials are
actively questioned and challenged.60 The polity must rely on those
who fulfill the function of the press in order to have the requisite infor-
mation to make informed choices.61
Finally, the functional role of the press was intended to create a
check on governmental power as the “Fourth Estate.”62 Anti-Federal-
ists like Patrick Henry were particularly concerned that the Constitu-
tion’s structure, which created checks and balances within the three
branches of government, was an insufficient safeguard against se-
55. Lovell, 303 U.S. at 452; Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966). This Com-
ment’s discussion of the “press” refers specifically to anyone who fulfills the func-
tional role foreseen in the Press Clause of publishing information to enlighten
and inform the people.
56. Parks, supra note 20, at 9.
57. Loveland, supra note 22, at 1464.
58. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
89 (1966) (Lawbook Exchange 2014).
59. LEBOVIC, supra note 18, at 24; Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”); Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life
Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2375 (2018) (“[T]he people lose when the
government is the one deciding which ideas should prevail.”). As James Madison
clearly asserted, “[T]he right of freely examining public characters and measures,
and a free communication thereon, is the only effective guardian of every other
right.” Parks, supra note 20, at 9.
60. CHAFEE JR., supra note 40, at 33.
61. LEVY, supra note 1, at 209.
62. ROBIN D. BARNES, OUTRAGEOUS INVASIONS: CELEBRITIES’ PRIVATE LIVES, MEDIA,
AND THE LAW 54 (2010) (Edmund Burke, an eighteenth-century British politician,
is credited with declaring that “although there are three Estates in Parliament,
the Reporters Gallery constituted a Fourth Estate . . . . Overnight, the term
Fourth Estate became synonymous with the press. Its popularity is a testament
to the notion that the avowed purpose of the Press Clause in the Constitution was
to create a mechanism outside of governmental control as an additional check on
the three official branches.”).
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crecy, abuse, and suppression.63 Another counterbalance outside the
government was necessary to limit potential misuse of power: the
press. The Framers viewed freedom of the press as an indispensable
component of a free government because it could thwart “government
oppression and tyranny.”64 The press was in a unique position not
only to critique the government, but also to disseminate information
to the masses.65
This emphasis on the free flow of information once again evokes an
overarching theme of the Press Clause: to inform the electorate.66 As
Justice Black eloquently argued in Milk Wagon Drivers Union v.
Meadowmoor Dairies,67
I view the guarantees of the First Amendment as the foundation upon which
our governmental structure rests and without which it could not continue to
endure as conceived and planned. Freedom to speak and write about public
questions is as important to the life of our government as is the heart to the
human body. In fact, this privilege is the heart of our government. If the heart
be weakened, the result is debilitation; if it be stilled, the result is death.68
B. The Court’s Expansion of the First Amendment
1. The Developing Interpretation of Prior Restraints
As discussed above, the First Amendment developed as a conse-
quence of experience with prior restraints. However, the scope of both
the Speech Clause and Press Clause have expanded significantly be-
yond their original reach.69 As critical as these clauses were to the
Framers, it was not until the 1930s that the Supreme Court defini-
tively spoke about the constitutionality of previous restraints.
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Near70 was a seminal moment for
freedom of the press. First, the Court emphatically stated that the
First Amendment’s protections were incorporated through the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause against the states.71 Second,
63. SMITH, supra note 7, at 31. Patrick Henry stated at the Constitutional Conven-
tion that “[t]he liberties of a people never were, nor ever will be, secure when the
transactions of their rulers may be concealed from them . . . .” DANIEL N. HOFF-
MAN, GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 35 (1981).
64. Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access and the First Amendment, 44 STAN.
L. REV. 927, 932 (1992) (quoting David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press
Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 487 (1983)).
65. Helle, supra note 24, at 8.
66. Id.
67. Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287
(1941).
68. Id. at 301–02.
69. Collins, supra note 39, at 759.
70. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
71. Id. at 707. The Court previously stated that “the main purpose of such constitu-
tional provisions is ‘to prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as
had been practiced by other governments.’” Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Att’y
198 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:188
the Court looked to the “historic conception of the liberty of the press”
to determine whether the “operation and effect” of the statute worked
as a prior restraint.72 In determining that the statute amounted to
“effective censorship,” the Court created a broad interpretation of
prior restraint analysis instead of limiting it to its narrow original
conception.73 The statute at issue did not conform to the historic prior
restraints utilized in England and the Colonies. Yet, in practice, the
law would operate as a prior restraint bringing it within the domain of
the Press Clause.74 While the Court affirmed an unprecedented ex-
pansive view of press freedom, the opinion also stated in dictum that
prior restraints might be constitutional in exceptional cases, such as
times of war.75
Five years later in Grosjean v. American Press Co.,76 the Supreme
Court reiterated its commitment to freedom from any form of prior
restraints or censorship while also restating a broad construction of
the First Amendment.77 This comprehensive interpretation was cre-
ated to “preserve an untrammeled press as a vital source of public in-
formation . . . since informed public opinion is the most potent of all
restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or abridgement of
the publicity afforded by a free press cannot be regarded otherwise
than with grave concern.”78
The prior restraint in Grosjean arose in the form of a tax, yet the
Supreme Court viewed it as a fac¸ade to “limit the circulation of infor-
mation to which the public is entitled.”79 The focus was once again on
the “operation and effect” of the state action as a prior restraint rather
than a narrow historic view of previous restraints. The emphasis on
the role of the press as a conduit for information is also significant.
The Court viewed the imposition of a tax on a newspaper as a viola-
tion of the freedom of the press because it would restrict the free flow
of information to the electorate.80
Gen. of Colo., 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (quoting Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20
Mass. 304, 313–14 (1825)).
72. Near, 283 U.S. at 708 (determining that “[t]he object of the statute is not punish-
ment, in the ordinary sense, but suppression of the offending newspaper or
periodical”).
73. Id. at 712.
74. Emerson, supra note 42, at 654–55.
75. Near, 283 U.S. at 716.
76. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249 (1936).
77. Id. at 249.
78. Id. at 250 (highlighting the importance of “newspapers, magazines, and other
journals” by stating that “a free press stands as one of the great interpreters
between government and the people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter
ourselves.”).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 249.
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Both the Framers and Supreme Court justices have been justifia-
bly concerned about prior restraints as opposed to subsequent punish-
ment of speech. A system of subsequent punishment requires a
governmental official to publicly prosecute the speaker after the com-
munication has been published and entails an expenditure of time and
money.81 However, a prior restraint in any form suppresses the com-
munication before it ever reaches the marketplace of ideas.82 Addi-
tionally, prior restraints can be implemented behind the scenes by a
single bureaucrat, whereas a prosecution initiated by the Executive in
the Judiciary plays out on the public stage.83 This danger of suppres-
sion led Chief Justice Burger to state that a subsequent punishment
“chills” speech, while a prior restraint “freezes” speech.84
2. The Expanded View of “Speech”
Regardless of the Framers’ original intent for the independence of
the Press Clause, the Supreme Court has typically treated it as an
extension of the Speech Clause. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze
what is considered “speech” under the First Amendment.85 It is appar-
ent that the Speech Clause protects language as well as other forms of
communication, such as the use of symbols.86 However, there are
three expansions of “speech” that are relevant to analyzing protections
for newsgathering. First, the shelter of the First Amendment reaches
beyond what is traditionally considered communication to nonverbal
conduct “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication.”87 For
example, the Supreme Court held that burning a flag to communicate
a political message can fall within the ambit of the Speech Clause.88
Second, conduct that is necessary or integrally tied to expression re-
ceives protection.89 The distribution of handbills90 or door-to-door so-
81. Emerson, supra note 42, at 657.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 657–58 (noting the danger of giving administrative officials the power of
prior restraint and observing that these systems tend toward “unintelligent,
overzealous, and usually absurd administration” which allows unelected bureau-
crats to be “driven by fear or other emotion to suppress free communication”).
84. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
85. Anderson, supra note 54, at 430.
86. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 11–12 (3d ed.
1996 & Supp. 2001).
87. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974). To focus merely on a citizen’s
“right to speak” overlooks many activities that the amendment protects.
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 58, at 95.
88. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418–19 (1989).
89. Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: To-
wards a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO
ST. L.J. 249, 259 (2004).
90. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
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licitation91 are examples of conduct that is not intrinsically
expressive, but is closely entwined with expression.92 Third, the Su-
preme Court has provided some measure of protection for conduct that
is not expressive, but is “necessary to accord full meaning and sub-
stance” to explicit First Amendment guarantees.93
In Lamont v. Postmaster General,94 the Court held that the right to
receive information is a fundamental right, as the “dissemination of
ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not
free to receive and consider them. It would be a barren marketplace of
ideas that had only sellers and no buyers.”95 Two decades later in
Board of Education v. Pico,96 the plurality stated that the right to re-
ceive information is an “inherent corollary to the rights of free speech
and press” because it inevitably follows a speaker’s communication
and it is an essential underpinning to the recipient’s free expression.97
It is also important to remember that just because a particular
form of expression falls within the scope of the First Amendment, that
does not mean that the government is unable to limit the expression.
When speech and nonspeech elements are both involved in conduct,
the O’Brien test allows the government to regulate the nonspeech as-
pect if: (1) it is justified by a sufficiently important governmental in-
terest; (2) that interest is not related to suppressing the speaker’s
expression; and (3) the incidental restriction on the speech element is
no greater than necessary to further the government’s interest.98
However, if the government attempts to limit conduct that is a pretext
to suppress the speaker’s expression, the regulation can only stand if
it survives strict scrutiny, the most rigorous standard of constitutional
review.99
91. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
168–69 (2002).
92. McDonald, supra note 89, at 259.
93. Id. at 260.
94. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
95. Id. at 308.
96. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion).
97. Id. at 867.
98. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968). Similarly, the government
is traditionally permitted to regulate expression if it is on a content-neutral basis
such as time, place, or manner restrictions that are justified without reference to
the content of the expression and are narrowly tailored to serve a significant gov-
ernment interest. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
99. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 278 (2000); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 403 (1989). This is treated similarly to a content-based restriction,
which requires the challenged regulation to advance a compelling interest and be
the least restrictive means of achieving that interest. Reed et. al. v. Town of Gil-
bert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015).
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C. Current Interpretation of the Right to Gather
Information
1. The Supreme Court’s Principles in Access and Newsgathering
Cases
Relatively few newsgathering cases have reached the Supreme
Court, and many of the cases that have reached the highest Court
have involved access to places, such as criminal trials or hearings,
rather than the gathering of information. Nevertheless, there are sev-
eral principles that can be distilled from Supreme Court precedent.
First, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to give the institu-
tional press any special privileges, such as access to places or informa-
tion, that are not shared by the general public.100 As long as a
particular government restriction does not single out the press for dis-
advantages but instead treats them on an equal playing field with av-
erage citizens, a regulation limiting access or information is
constitutional regardless of whether it impedes effective reporting.101
Unfortunately, this concern over granting the institutional press spe-
cial rights—instead of focusing on the functional role of the press in
our constitutional scheme—has colored many of the Court’s decisions
in this area of law.102
However, a few justices have recognized and argued for the distinc-
tion between protections for the institutional press verses the func-
tions of the press. In Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,103 Justice Powell
filed a powerful dissent arguing that the press should not receive spe-
cial privileges based on being a member of the institutional press, but
because they are “agent[s] of the public at large” whose constitutional
role is to inform the electorate.104
While Branzburg v. Hayes105 acknowledged in dictum that “with-
out some constitutional protection for seeking out the news, freedom
of the press could be eviscerated,”106 the Supreme Court has typically
upheld the dichotomy between newsgathering and publication.107
100. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (holding that the First Amendment
provides no affirmative duty on the government to give journalists information
that is not available to the general public); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682
(1972).
101. See Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 847 (1974) (declining to apply the
policy in question to prohibit a person who was otherwise eligible to visit inmates
from doing so on the basis of being a member of the press).
102. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 12 (1978) (framing the issue as the press
claiming a “special privilege of access” which the Court firmly rejected).
103. Saxbe, 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
104. Id. at 863 (Powell, J., dissenting).
105. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
106. Id. at 681.
107. Id. (“But these cases involve no intrusions upon speech or assembly, no prior re-
straint or restriction on what the press may publish, and no express or implied
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Thus, communication is protected by the First Amendment, but access
or newsgathering is “not essential to guarantee the freedom to com-
municate or publish.”108 This distinction stems from the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Zemel v. Rusk,109 and has been carried through
many of the newsgathering cases. However, it is important to note
that in Zemel, the plaintiff requested permission to travel to Cuba “to
satisfy his curiosity”—not to publish or disseminate the informa-
tion.110 Several dissents have dissolved this dichotomy, stating:
a corollary to the right to publish must be the right to gather news . . . . No
less important to the news dissemination process is the gathering of informa-
tion. News must not be unnecessarily cut off at its source, for without freedom
to acquire information the right to publish would be impermissibly
compromised.111
The Supreme Court has traditionally refused to allow the First
Amendment to be used as a “sword” to affirmatively compel informa-
tion, especially from the government. In Pell v. Procunier,112 the Su-
preme Court emphatically stated that the Constitution does not
impose on the government the “affirmative duty to make available to
journalists sources of information not available to members of the
public generally.”113 The Court seemed to imply that while govern-
ment officials could not unduly interfere with newsgathering, journal-
ists could not compel the government to provide information.114
Further, in Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,115 the plurality asserted that
any protection under the First Amendment for newsgathering did not
apply when seeking information in the government’s control.116 In the
plurality’s view, government-controlled information was outside the
realm of the First Amendment and squarely within the political or
legislative processes.117 However, this standard seems incongruous
with the Court’s consistent warnings that governmental or political
speech occupy the “core” of First Amendment protection.118
command that the press publish what it prefers to withhold. No exaction or tax
for the privilege of publishing, and no penalty, civil or criminal, related to the
content of published material is at issue here.”).
108. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 12 (1978); See also Saxbe, 417 U.S. at
858 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[T]he dichotomy between speech and action, while
often helpful to analysis, is too uncertain to serve as the dispositive factor in
charting the outer boundaries of First Amendment concerns.”).
109. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
110. Id. at 4 (holding “the right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unre-
strained right to gather information”).
111. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 727–28.
112. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
113. Id. at 836.
114. McDonald, supra note 89, at 312.
115. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
116. Id. at 12.
117. Id.
118. McDonald, supra note 89, at 309.
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Only in more recent cases has the Supreme Court begun to recog-
nize the societal values underlying the First Amendment and their
direct connection to newsgathering. For example, in Justice Powell’s
Saxbe dissent he emphasized the societal function of press freedom in
promoting an “unfettered” and “informed” public debate.119 He con-
tended that government regulations that undermine this function by
incidentally restricting speech through limits on newsgathering must
be justified by a substantial governmental interest unrelated to the
suppression of expression and limit no more expression than is neces-
sary, which is similar language to the O’Brien standard mentioned
above.120 Justice Stevens’ dissent in Houchins also argued that the
fundamental objective of freedom of speech and press is maintaining
the free flow of information to the electorate in order to preserve the
process of self-governance.121
Finally, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,122 the plurality
agreed that the First Amendment’s goal of fostering communication
mandated access to criminal trials.123 The Court decided that certain
unarticulated rights are “implicit in enumerated guarantees.”124 The
concurrence of Justice Brennan in Richmond Newspapers took this ar-
gument one step further: underscoring the structural role of the First
Amendment in fostering self-government, he stated, “[t]he structural
model links the First Amendment to that process of communication
necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus entails solicitude not
only for communication itself, but also for the indispensable conditions
of meaningful communication.”125
Ultimately, the only affirmative grant of access the Supreme Court
has provided is in the context of criminal trials. In Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court,126 the majority held that access could only be
denied to a criminal trial if it survived strict scrutiny due to the “broad
principles” underlying the Speech and Press Clauses, which secured
unenumerated rights necessary to the enjoyment of other First
Amendment rights.127 The analysis adopted by the Court in this case,
119. Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“An
informed public depends on accurate and effective reporting by the news media.
No individual can obtain for himself the information needed for the intelligent
discharge of his political responsibilities.”).
120. Id. at 655.
121. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion).
123. Id. at 580. The Court further stated that “[p]eople in an open society do not de-
mand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept
what they are prohibited from observing.” Id. at 572.
124. Id. at 579.
125. Id. at 587–88 (Brennan, J., concurring).
126. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
127. Id. at 604. The Court held that free discussion of governmental affairs guarantees
that citizens can successfully participate in our system of self-government. Id.
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however, could easily be extended to other areas of access or new-
sgathering. The Supreme Court also adopted Justice Brennan’s two
“helpful principles” from his concurrence in Richmond Newspapers.
First, the Court looked to whether the particular proceeding had his-
torically been open to the press and public.128 The second considera-
tion was whether public scrutiny of a criminal trial enhanced the
integrity of the proceeding.129 To summarize, even though the Court
has taken a step toward safeguarding newsgathering in the context of
criminal trials, there has still been a reluctance to extend this protec-
tion any further.
2. The Statutory Right to Gather Information
While the primary focus of this Comment is newsgathering within
the context of the First Amendment, it is also necessary to look at
statutory protections for the gathering of information. The Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA)130 was originally passed in 1966 in response
to swelling Executive power and escalating public distrust of govern-
ment.131 The FOIA was an attempt by Congress to curb the ever-ex-
panding reach of the Executive bureaucracy and reinstate a
semblance of oversight.132 Congress’ goal was to promote openness in
government so the people, and particularly the press as the Fourth
Estate, could be the vigilant watchdog of corruption, waste, and un-
necessary secrecy.133
The FOIA provides a statutory basis for any citizen to obtain fed-
eral agency records.134 The law provides a presumption of access and
places the burden of proof on the government if it attempts to with-
hold information.135 There are nine legal categories exempted from
disclosure under the FOIA. These exemptions include records related
solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency (Ex-
128. Id. at 605 (underscoring that the right of access is specifically limited to the con-
text of criminal trials; however, this analysis could easily be extended to other
contexts).
129. Id. at 606.
130. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 2016).
131. Jordan, supra note 49, at 1374. The rising secrecy state led Congressman John
Moss on a twelve-year crusade to pass the FOIA. Moss famously stated, “We
must remove every barrier to information about—and understanding of—govern-
ment activities consistent with our security if the American public is to be ade-
quately equipped to fulfill the ever more demanding role of responsible
citizenship.” David L. Hudson Jr., 50 Years Later, Freedom of Information Act
Still Chipping Away at Government’s Secretive Culture, ABA J. (July 2016), http:/
/www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/50th_anniversary_of_the_freedom_of_in
formation_act [https://perma.unl.edu/TYE4-2299].
132. MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE RISE OF THE RIGHT TO KNOW 57 (2015).
133. Jordan, supra note 49, at 1375–76.
134. Turner, supra note 41, at 602.
135. Id. at 602–03.
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emption 2), trade secrets or financial information (Exemption 4), and
information that would constitute an unwarranted invasion of per-
sonal privacy (Exemption 6).136
Federal agencies have historically interpreted the exemptions, es-
pecially Exemption 1 and Exemption 5, broadly.137 Under Exemption
1, agencies are permitted to withhold information that is specifically
authorized by an executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
national defense or foreign policy and are in fact properly classified
pursuant to such executive order.138 Exemption 5, which has become
known as the “withhold it because you want to” exemption,139 allows
agencies to refuse to release information that would be considered
privileged in a legal proceeding or fall under “deliberative process.”140
This protects any agency communication that is (1) predecisional,
meaning prior to adoption of a policy; and (2) deliberative, meaning
any documents expressing opinions on policy or legal issues.141 To
provide a picture of how these exemptions have been used to suppress
the release of information, during fiscal year 2014, federal agencies
cited exemptions to suppress information in over 550,000 documents
related to almost 220,000 requests.142
Next, this Comment will apply the originalist understanding of the
First Amendment while advocating for a broad interpretation of the
Press Clause and a limited right to gather information constructed on
both the First Amendment itself and the structural model of freedom
of expression.
III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court’s expanded view of what constitutes speech, as
well as a nearly universal prohibition on prior restraints, has had a
significant impact on how the Executive Branch handles information.
The New Deal gave rise to a centralized Executive that deposed the
Legislative Branch as the center of policymaking.143 Prior to the New
Deal there were only two significant regulatory agencies: the Inter-
state Commerce Commission and the Federal Trade Commission.144
Soon, these “quasi-legislative, quasi-executive, quasi-judicial” agen-
136. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 2016).
137. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 114TH CONG., FOIA IS BRO-
KEN: A REPORT 8 (2016) [hereinafter FOIA IS BROKEN].
138. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 2016).
139. FOIA IS BROKEN, supra note 137, at 10.
140. Id. at 9–10.
141. Id. at 9.
142. Gardiner Harris, House to Weigh Overhaul of Open Records Process, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/11/us/politics/house-to-weigh-
overhaul-of-open-records-process.html [https://perma.unl.edu/UF5H-69LK].
143. LEBOVIC, supra note 18, at 56–58.
144. SCHUDSON, supra note 132, at 244.
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cies became essential to the structure and operation of the federal gov-
ernment.145 Executive agencies also began using formal press
conferences and news releases to generate public support for poli-
cies.146 Simultaneously, Congress struggled to compete with the
swiftly inflating Executive while continuing its constitutionally pro-
scribed role of oversight.147
In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,148 the Court held that when
the press “lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of pub-
lic significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish
publication of the information.”149 The Supreme Court no longer al-
lowed explicit censorship, so instead the Executive stifled the flow of
information at the source, crafting a new form of prior restraint.150
The secrecy state originally developed out of wartime fear, but soon
decisions regarding what should be released to the public became pro-
gressively political.151
Today, the Executive Branch has nearly unchecked control over
the flow of information to the electorate through the classification sys-
tem.152 Government officials selectively leak information to the press
allowing only the release of information favorable to their position
while classifying the unfavorable information.153 In 2017, the Execu-
tive Branch made 58,501 original classification decisions and over 49
million derivative classification decisions.154 While the total number
of classification decisions was the lowest since 2008, the abuse of the
classification system remains a cause for concern, as much of what is
deemed “classified” is done so for illegitimate reasons.155 Former So-
licitor General Erwin Griswold stated, “it quickly becomes apparent to
145. Id.
146. LEBOVIC, supra note 18, at 56–58.
147. SCHUDSON, supra note 132, at 254.
148. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
149. Id. at 103. Once information is “publicly revealed” or “in the public domain” a
court cannot restrain its dissemination without violating the First Amendment.
Okla. Publ’g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308, 311–12 (1977).
150. LEBOVIC, supra note 18, at 132.
151. Id. at 118.
152. Papandrea, supra note 3, at 236.
153. Loveland, supra note 22, at 1466. One could argue that these leaks or
whistleblowers are a sufficient method of acquiring government information.
However, this method is “uncertain and haphazard” rather than permitting a
free flow of information. McDonald, supra note 89, at 311 n.225.
154. INFO. SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFF., 2017 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 1 (2017), https://
www.archives.gov/files/isoo/reports/2017-annual-report.pdf [https://perma.unl
.edu/XR39-TRSX].
155. COMM’N ON PROTECTING & REDUCING GOV’T SECRECY, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT SECRECY, S. DOC. NO. 105-2, at 36
(1997) (quoting Former National Security Council Secretary Rodney McDaniel
who estimated that only ten percent of classification decisions are made for a
legitimate purpose).
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any person who has considerable experience with classified material
that there is massive overclassification and that the principal concern
of the classifiers is not with national security, but rather with the gov-
ernmental embarrassment of one sort or another.”156
As the government suppression of information burgeoned, a new
form of democracy took root in the United States. Instead of citizens
holding their government accountable only on election day, the mid-
1960s saw the emergence of continual accountability through an ad-
versarial media, think tanks, public opinion polling, and nongovern-
mental watchdog agencies.157 A flourishing cultural appreciation for
governmental transparency developed, which valued accessibility of
information over secrecy.
Without some protection for newsgathering activities, the electo-
rate is unable to discover information necessary to self-governance. As
stated in Smith, “[a] free press cannot be made to rely solely upon the
sufferance of government to supply it with information.”158 Yet, thus
far, the Supreme Court has been emphatic in stating that there is no
protection for a right to gather under the First Amendment.159 How-
ever, as discussed above, there are two distinctions that the Court has
failed to make which have blurred the issue. First, the Court has re-
fused to acknowledge a distinction between the Speech Clause and the
Press Clause, instead treating the latter as a mere redundancy. Yet, it
is clear from the original meaning of the Press Clause that it was in-
tended to specifically protect the use of the printing press for the wide
dissemination of ideas, particularly those of a political nature.160
Second, although the Court is correct in asserting that the press
should not be given special institutional protections based on the origi-
nal meaning of the First Amendment, the history of the Press Clause
clearly demonstrates that it was intended to provide a shield for the
functional role that any citizen performs when she writes down and
publishes material with the intent of disseminating it.161 Thus, the
Press Clause should be read to provide separate safeguards for anyone
who fulfills the functional role of utilizing a modern “printing press.”
It is upon this foundation that a limited right to gather information
can be constructed. The analysis will begin by advocating for a broad
construction of the scope of the First Amendment. Next, it will propose
three primary arguments for why the First Amendment’s Press and
Speech Clauses, as interpreted consistently with their original mean-
ing, should encompass a limited right of newsgathering: (1) the Press
156. Id. at A-63.
157. SCHUDSON, supra note 132, at 24–25.
158. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104 (1979).
159. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
160. LEVY, supra note 1, at 273.
161. Jordan, supra note 49, at 1361.
208 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:188
Clause forbids the government from using prior restraints, yet restric-
tions on newsgathering act as a form of prior restraint; (2) new-
sgathering activities that are directly tied to expression should fall
within the ambit of the Speech and Press Clauses; and (3) a structural
analysis of the First Amendment lends support for recognizing new-
sgathering as a systemic right.
A. The First Amendment’s Scope Should Be Interpreted
Broadly and Include Protection of Corollary Rights
It is important to begin with a foundational understanding of the
scope of the Press Clause to understand why its interpretation should
include a broad protection of corollary rights. The Supreme Court has
stated that the liberty of the press must be given the “broadest scope
that explicit language, read in the context of a liberty-loving society,
will allow.”162 Thus, not only should the clause be interpreted with the
broadest scope possible, but it should also be construed in a way to
promote liberty. The Supreme Court has held that the free flow of in-
formation, which underscores press liberty, necessarily embraces co-
rollary rights such as the right to receive information,163 the right to
distribute information,164 the freedom of inquiry,165 and the right to
read.166 The “spirit of the First Amendment” restrains the govern-
ment’s ability to diminish the range of available information.167 This
governmental restraint promotes the freedom of speech and press; it
protects both the speech and the speaker, comprising the ideas that
flow from each.168
In order for the First Amendment to protect the free flow of infor-
mation, it must encompass “peripheral rights,” which secure the
clause’s enumerated rights.169 First, these corollary rights affirm the
purposes underlying free expression. The Court has held that the
Speech Clause and Press Clause require protection for the right to re-
ceive information, as the marketplace of ideas would be desolate if
there were “only sellers and no buyers.”170 Second, the First Amend-
ment safeguards the right to distribute information.171 The freedom to
162. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941).
163. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762–63 (1972) (emphasizing that freedom of
speech “protects the right to receive information and ideas”).
164. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
165. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 193 (1952) (stating that “[w]hen used to
shackle the mind [test oaths] are . . . unspeakably odious to a free people”).
166. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (holding that the right to read and
observe is “fundamental to our scheme of individual liberty”).
167. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
168. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 341 (2010).
169. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482–83.
170. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (plurality opinion).
171. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
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circulate information is critical to our democratic institutions; there-
fore, the dissemination of ideas cannot be restricted.172 Furthermore,
circulating information cannot be divorced from publishing informa-
tion because publication without circulation would lose its value.173
Examining the Press Clause’s peripheral rights provides a basis for
a limited right to gather as a corollary to the First Amendment. Just
as the right to receive or distribute information is necessary for the
full enjoyment of the freedoms of speech and the press, so too is the
right to gather information. With an established scope of the First
Amendment, a limited right to gather information can now be
composed.
B. Argument for a Limited Right to Gather Information
Under the First Amendment
1. Restrictions on Newsgathering as a Form of Prior Restraint
The Executive Branch’s unchecked power to control the flow of in-
formation has created a new form of prior restraint. Though direct re-
strictions on publication have been held unconstitutional,174
controlling information at its source has the same outcome—prevent-
ing publication—without the government fearing prior restraint anal-
ysis by the courts. Thus, the Supreme Court has usually avoided the
critical question in newsgathering cases: is a restraint on newsgather-
ing a prior restraint on publication?
This element of the analysis has been circumvented because the
Supreme Court has bifurcated publication from newsgathering.175 In-
stead of treating newsgathering as an essential component of the pub-
lication process, a dichotomy has been instilled that provides
protections for publishing, but not newsgathering.176 By creating this
dichotomy, the Court can apply prior restraint analysis to restrictions
on publication, while declining to apply the same analysis to restric-
tions on newsgathering. While any prior restraint of publication is un-
172. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146–47 (1943). Any restriction on the distribu-
tion of information must be examined by weighing the circumstances and sub-
stantiality of the purposes given in support of the restriction. Schneider v. Town
of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
173. Lovell, 303 U.S. at 452. Preeminent First Amendment scholar Thomas Emerson
argued that the “reverse side of the coin” of the right to speak is the right to
receive information and the right to obtain information. Thomas I. Emerson, Le-
gal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 2 (1976).
174. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (stating “any system of
prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity” (quoting Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S.
58, 70 (1963))).
175. Helle, supra note 24, at 42.
176. Erik Ugland, Demarcating the Right to Gather News, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 113, 182 (2008).
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constitutional, it seems that newsgathering is apparently too removed
or satisfactorily “prior” to publication, thus restraints on newsgather-
ing are permitted.177
Regardless of the supposed distinction between gathering and pub-
lishing, permitting restraints on newsgathering inevitably controls
what can be published. Just as the right to receive information is an
“inherent corollary” to the freedom of speech,178 the right to gather
information is a necessary corollary to the freedom of the press.179
When the government restricts access to information as a pretext for
regulating what information can be published, this is a prior restraint
and should be a violation of the First Amendment.180
Further, allowing the Executive Branch in particular to have the
power to limit or control newsgathering activities permits unelected
bureaucrats to “dictate the content of the news.”181 The original intent
behind the Press Clause was the libertarian precept that the govern-
ment should have no role in determining what should be published.182
The Bill of Rights does not contain any affirmative rights, but instead
contains negative rights that place restrictions on the exercise of gov-
ernmental power as a mechanism for protecting individual liber-
ties.183 Therefore, a right to gather should likewise be viewed as a
negative right limiting the government’s ability to withhold, suppress,
or censor information. However, by upholding the publication/gather-
ing dichotomy, which permits restraints on gathering, the Judiciary
has enabled the Executive to decide what should and should not be
published, directly undermining the purpose of the freedom of the
press.184
177. Helle, supra note 19, at 36.
178. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (plurality opinion).
179. Jordan, supra note 49, at 1364.
180. See Helle, supra note 24, at 45 (“[I]f the entity that controls gathering effectively
controls publication, the dichotomy collapses . . . and government obtains a dis-
tinct advantage in the contest between government and the press.”).
181. Id. at 43 (observing that journalists report the “news” that government officials
reveal). The press is rarely successful in uncovering information that the govern-
ment intends to keep secret as numerous “public information specialists” spend
their careers managing and filtering the information the electorate receives. Id.
at 44.
182. LEVY, supra note 1, at 270.
183. See also Jordan, supra note 49, at 1358 (stating that there are two different forms
of provisions in the Constitution: those that deal with the balance of power be-
tween the various branches and the states, and those that restrict the exercise of
governmental power of individual rights).
184. See Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66
MINN. L. REV. 11, 73 (1981) (“To trust the censor more than the audience is to
alter the relationship between state and citizen that is central to the philosophy
of limited government.”).
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2. The First Amendment Creates Protection for Newsgathering
that is Directly Tied to Expression
To reiterate, the Supreme Court has bifurcated the publication
process into two distinct stages: gathering and publishing. This bifur-
cation has resulted in the Court applying two different standards
when analyzing a government restraint at each stage. Publishing is
considered “expressive” and is analyzed under traditional First
Amendment principles.185 Newsgathering, on the other hand, is con-
sidered “nonexpressive” and therefore is not afforded First Amend-
ment protection.186
Dividing the process of publication into two distinct phases, how-
ever, is inconsistent with the Court’s own First Amendment prece-
dent. In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,187 for
example, the Court stated that “laws enacted to control or suppress
speech may operate at different points in the speech process.”188 Cam-
paign–finance regulations were held to implicate First Amendment
protection not because money is speech, but because money facilitates
political speech.189 The government was not permitted to silence par-
ticular voices regardless of where in the speech process the restriction
occurred.190 Further, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,191
the Court stated that the “First Amendment goes beyond protection of
the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit govern-
ment from limiting the stock of information from which members of
the public may draw.”192 However, the Court has abandoned this pre-
cedent and allows the government to do just that by controlling new-
sgathering activities and thus limiting the information that reaches
the public sphere.
As discussed in subsection II.B.2, the Supreme Court has ex-
panded the concept of “speech” under the First Amendment to apply to
185. McDonald, supra note 89, at 258–59. See also Steven Helle, Reconsidering the
Gathering/Publication Dichotomy, 33 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 537, 541 (2013) (“[I]f the
government action was not aimed directly at publication, it was not aimed at the
First Amendment.”).
186. McDonald, supra note 89, at 268. Gathering has not been analyzed under First
Amendment prior restraint analysis but could be even more effective at sup-
pressing information than an actual restraint on publication. Helle, supra note
185, at 557.
187. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
188. Id. at 336.
189. Id. at 339–40. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (Restricting money
in campaigns “necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the
number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the
audience reached.”).
190. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337.
191. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1977).
192. Id.
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conduct that is integrally tied to expression.193 The Court has also
granted some protection for conduct that is not expressive in and of
itself, but is “necessary to accord full meaning and substance” to ex-
plicit First Amendment guarantees.194 Even in access cases, the Court
has implied that this protection exists by stating the “First Amend-
ment is thus broad enough to encompass those rights that, while not
unambiguously enumerated in the very terms of the amendment, are
nonetheless necessary to the enjoyment of other First Amendment
rights.”195
Stated simply, the government is permitted to regulate expressive
conduct only if the regulation is attempting to control the nonexpres-
sive aspects of the conduct and is unrelated to the suppression of the
expression itself.196 In light of this, if “newsgathering” is divorced
from publication, it is not expressive conduct that would traditionally
enjoy First Amendment protection because the publication and dis-
semination are the expressive components. However, courts have re-
fused to “disconnect the end product from the act of creation” in other
contexts.197 In the world of the 24/7 news cycle, there is a continuous
process of gathering information with the express intent of informing
the public through editing the gathered news and then disseminating
it.198
Just as the process of political speech in campaigns includes rais-
ing money to facilitate the speech, the process of publication includes
gathering information to facilitate the functional role of the press.
While newsgathering in and of itself might not be expressive, it is the
necessary antecedent to publication and is undertaken with the clear
objective of expression.199
Protecting newsgathering activities that are directly linked to ex-
pression (publication) respects the original meaning and textual limi-
tations of the First Amendment, while also fulfilling the underlying
goals of facilitating debate and informing the public.200 Furthermore,
this would provide a precise limitation on a newsgathering right
under the First Amendment, whereas a more universal “right to
know” would have no limiting factor and would be inconsistent with
both the original meaning of the Speech and Press Clauses as well as
193. McDonald, supra note 89, at 259.
194. Id. at 260.
195. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982).
196. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
197. Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2010).
198. Helle, supra note 24, at 45.
199. McDonald, supra note 89, at 344.
200. Id. at 345. See also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“Whatever differ-
ences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practi-
cally universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to
protect free discussion of governmental affairs.”).
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the Court’s precedent.201 Under this conception of newsgathering, an-
yone who fulfills the functional role of the press by gathering informa-
tion with the evident intention of disseminating it would be afforded
protection.202 Thus, journalists, scholars, bloggers, and the “lonely
pamphleteer” would all be protected as long as they are engaged in
newsgathering with the intention of communicating the information
gathered to the public.203 This conception provides a direct link be-
tween the gathering of information and the expressive nature of publi-
cation, pulling newsgathering firmly within the ambit of the First
Amendment.
3. The Structural Model of the First Amendment Requires
Protection for Newsgathering in Order to Foster
Intelligent Self-Government
Freedom of expression, embracing both freedom of speech and of
the press, necessarily recognizes the individual’s right to have per-
sonal opinions and communicate them. However, there is also a vital
societal interest cultivated by free expression: the dissemination of in-
formation through “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” public de-
bate.204 It is through this collective process that the First Amendment
plays a fundamental role in the structure of government.205 The struc-
tural model links public debate fostered by free expression to our re-
publican system of self-government.206 The communication protected
by the First Amendment promotes not only knowledge, but “sane and
201. McDonald, supra note 89, at 344–45. McDonald advocates for several require-
ments in order to claim First Amendment protection for information-gathering.
These requirements would promote the societal interests of the First Amendment
rather than individual interests. First, the content of the information sought
should be about general matters of public concern, such as governmental affairs.
Id. at 345–48. Second, there must be an intent to disseminate the information,
which would promote the functional role of the Press Clause. Id. at 348–49. Fi-
nally, the person attempting to obtain the information of public concern in order
to disseminate it should have certain bona fides to ensure that the information
will be collected in a responsible manner and will indeed be dispersed to the pub-
lic. Id. at 350–51.
202. Collins, supra note 39, at 780 (arguing that the functional conception of the Press
Clause, properly understood, supports a constitutional preference for anyone ful-
filling the functional role of the press).
203. Id. at 764 (contending “the Press Clause shelters a more diverse range of people
other than the institutional press because people or entities come within the pro-
tection of the Press Clause when they publish with the intent to communicate”).
204. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
205. Jordan, supra note 49, at 1368.
206. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587–88 (1980) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
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objective judgment” which voters are subsequently able to express at
the ballot box.207
The Supreme Court has long recognized the right to vote as an in-
herent systemic right in our constitutional scheme, stating that “other
rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is under-
mined.”208 However, it is not simply a right to vote that must be pro-
tected, but the “antecedent assumption” that civic behavior must be
informed for democracy to survive.209 The freedom of the press specifi-
cally was meant to protect public debate from government censorship,
which is essential for the polity to intelligently exercise its rights.210
True self-government requires elected leaders to be responsive to the
will of the people, and information is the means by which the people
control the government. Thus, the First Amendment was intended to
facilitate the dissemination of information and ideas to inform voters
who are then able to fully participate in the democratic process.211
The suppression of information, particularly information gener-
ated by the more than sixty unelected executive agencies, can manipu-
late and extinguish a government by consent and its system of checks
and balances.212 As Justice Douglas stated, “Secrecy in government is
fundamentally anti-democratic.”213 This is why the dominant purpose
of the First Amendment is to proscribe government suppression of
information.
207. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV.
245, 256 (1961). Additionally, one scholar argues that there could be no “right to
know” government information due to our representative form of democracy, as-
serting that “[s]ince the Constitution does not establish a direct democracy, the
inference of a right to know cannot find its constitutional source in the view of
popular democracy which contemplates direct citizen participation in the making
and administration of laws.” Lillian R. BeVier, An Informed Public, an Informing
Press: The Search for a Constitutional Principle, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 482, 506
(1980). However, this Comment is not advocating for a general “right to know,”
but instead a limited right to gather as a systemic right of our representative
democracy. It is irrelevant if citizens participate in the “making and administra-
tion of laws.” What citizens participate in is the selection of representatives to
make and administer laws. In order to be able to intelligently exercise that right,
citizens must have the requisite knowledge on which to base their decisions.
208. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
209. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Bran-
deis also recognized that individuals have “limited time and resources with which
to observe at first hand the operations of his government . . . great responsibility
is accordingly placed upon the news media to report fully and accurately the pro-
ceedings of government . . . . Without the information provided by the press most
of us and many of our representatives would be unable to vote intelligently.” Cox
Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491–92 (1975).
210. COOLEY, supra note 48, at 421–22.
211. Jordan, supra note 49, at 1372–73.
212. Parks, supra note 20, at 2.
213. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 724 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
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The right of the polity to use information to debate, discuss, and
reach consensus by voting is a precondition to self-government.214 In
an era of “fake news” and Russian use of false information to influence
elections,215 the protection of the free flow of accurate information to
voters is more crucial than ever. Yet, the “paper curtain” has largely
closed the people off from accurate government information.216 Opin-
ions are derived from the information that reaches the public. If the
only news reaching the public is “fake” or manipulated, the people’s
ability to self-govern is directly affected. Walter Lippman called the
idea of self-governance the “original dogma of democracy,” which can
only be protected by increasing the validity of the sources upon which
voters act.217 Therefore, the key element in the structural model of the
First Amendment that protects intelligent self-government is
information.218
The power of information is a double-edged sword that can be
wielded by the people to force their will upon their governors, or by the
governors to manipulate the people for their own advantage.219 It is a
fundamental principle of our constitutional system that free public
discussion allows the people to lawfully implement change and force
the government to be responsive to the will of the voters.220 The Su-
preme Court took this argument one step further by stating that “pub-
lic discussion is a political duty” and “the path of safety lies in the
opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed reme-
dies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.”221
However, this “political duty” presupposes the free flow of informa-
tion, for without it there can be no public discussion.222 The effective
dissemination of the news requires the correlative right of gathering
214. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010).
215. Mike Isaac & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Russian Influence Reached 126 Million
Through Facebook Alone, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/10/30/technology/facebook-google-russia.html [https://perma.unl.edu/2EZ6-
2LBT].
216. Parks, supra note 20, at 6. The only information that breaches the “paper cur-
tain” is what officials in executive agencies deem publishable in their personal
discretion—usually for a particular purpose or due to strong pressure. Id.
217. LEBOVIC, supra note 18, at 26–29.
218. See 10 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to William Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), in
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 160, 161 (Ford ed., 1899) (“I know no safe
depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves; and if
we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome
discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their
discretion.”).
219. Helle, supra note 24, at 56.
220. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
221. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring),
overruled in part on other grounds by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
222. As was eloquently stated by Thomas Emerson, one who seeks knowledge “must
hear all sides of the question, consider all alternatives, test his judgement by
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information, otherwise the “freedom of the press could be
eviscerated.”223
The right of the people to have sufficient information for self-gov-
ernment is inherent in the power of the voters to “make and unmake
governments.”224 This is not an explicitly delegated right; it is a right
retained by the people.225 With the people as the ultimate rulers, the
government has no right to treat information as proprietary.226 The
First Amendment’s checking value against corruption is indispensable
to the system of restraints constructed to deal with official miscon-
duct.227 The free flow of information reveals abuse and allows the peo-
ple to satisfy the ultimate check on corruption by voting out dishonest
representatives.228
C. Why the FOIA is Not Sufficient to Protect the Free Flow
of Information
In response to this Comment’s contention that the First Amend-
ment demands a limited right to gather information, some may argue
that this right is unnecessary due to the FOIA. However, even though
the FOIA was passed and amended with good intentions, in practice it
has been ineffective. Ultimately, the effectiveness of the FOIA is se-
verely diminished by the broad scope given to its nine exceptions by
both the Executive Branch and the courts reviewing decisions to with-
hold information.229
Courts are still extremely deferential to the Executive Branch, es-
pecially concerning Exemption 1 national security issues, thus turn-
ing judicial review of agency decisions into a virtual rubber stamp.230
Congress amended the FOIA again in 2016 in an attempt to repair
some of the inefficiencies and prevent abuse.231 The amendments pro-
exposing it to opposition, and make full use of different minds.” THOMAS I. EMER-
SON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–7 (1970).
223. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
224. Jordan, supra note 49, at 1371.
225. This idea stems from the Ninth Amendment which unequivocally states that,
“[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
226. McDonald, supra note 89, at 318.
227. George W. Kelly, Richmond Newspapers and the First Amendment Right of Ac-
cess, 18 AKRON L. REV. 33, 39 (1984).
228. Id.
229. Cohen, supra note 23, at 175.
230. Papandrea, supra note 3, at 244–45. Judicial review of classified materials under
FOIA “often seems to be done in a perfunctory way.” Patricia M. Wald, Two Un-
solved Constitutional Problems, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 753, 760 (1988). As Justice
Scalia stated, the notion that the exemptions within FOIA should be construed
narrowly is “a formula to be recited rather than a principle to be followed.” John
Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 161 (1989).
231. See generally FOIA IS BROKEN, supra note 137.
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hibited the charging of record fees, required disclosure of requested
information (unless disclosure would result in harm to a protected in-
terest under the FOIA), established dispute resolution services,
amended Exemption 5, and created a council for the FOIA.232
There are countless examples of the government taking inordinate
amounts of time to respond to FOIA requests or of FOIA requests be-
ing rejected for seemingly absurd reasons. David Garrow, a historian
writing a biography on Martin Luther King Jr., waited seventeen
years for documents he requested through the FOIA.233 Another his-
torian, John Weiner, requested John Lennon’s FBI files through the
FOIA in 1981, but they were withheld for “national security” rea-
sons.234 After a lawsuit and sixteen years, he finally received most of
the files he requested.235 Anyone with experience using the FOIA
quickly realizes that the law favors the government, not the person
requesting the files, due to procedures and exceptions that are “ig-
nored or manipulated.”236
Despite the purposes behind the FOIA, the Executive Branch con-
tinues to foster a culture of an “unlawful presumption in favor of se-
crecy,”237 and the discretion allowed has created a distorted incentive
to overclassify information.238 The Director of the National Security
Archives estimates that anywhere from 50% to 90% of documents are
misclassified.239 This indicates that the Executive has effectively
uninhibited power to control the flow of information, particularly by
deeming information “classified.”240 For example, President Obama
promised to have the “most transparent administration in history,”
yet during his last year in office his administration spent a record
$36.2 million on legal fees defending its refusal to release documents
under FOIA requests.241 The Obama administration also set records
for outright refusal of access to documents; in one-third of these law-
232. FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 2016).
233. SCHUDSON, supra note 132, at 33.
234. Id. at 34.
235. Id.
236. PHILIP H. MELANSON, SECRECY WARS 31 (2001).
237. FOIA IS BROKEN, supra note 137, at iii.
238. Elizabeth Goitein, The Government is Classifying Too Many Documents, THE NA-
TION (July 7, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-government-is-classi-
fying-too-many-documents/ [https://perma.unl.edu/9KY8-LTVU].
239. Espionage Act and the Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by WikiLeaks:
Hearing on H.R. 6506 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2 (2010)
(prepared statement of Thomas S. Blanton, Dir., Nat’l Sec. Archive, George
Wash. Univ.).
240. Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Publication of National Security Information in the
Digital Age, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 119, 120 (2012).
241. Ted Bridis, In Obama’s Final Year, U.S. Spent $36 Million in FOIA Lawsuits,
PBS NEWS HOUR (March 14, 2017), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/
obamas-final-year-u-s-spent-36-million-foia-lawsuits [https://perma.unl.edu/T2
56-23F8].
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suits, the administration admitted that it had been wrong in refusing
to turn over all or part of the records requested.242
President Trump’s administration has set new records for with-
holding documents or failing to find even a single page responsive to
the FOIA request.243 In 78% of FOIA requests the government re-
sponded to the request with either a censored file or nothing.244 In
2017, the federal government spent $40.6 million defending decisions
to suppress files.245 Regardless of whether a Republican or Democrat
is in office, the Executive Branch continues to encourage concealment
of information rather than releasing it to the people who have a right
to view it as the ultimate governors. The problem of overclassification
is compounded by courts that consistently defer to the Executive in
matters of “national security” instead of engaging in legitimate judi-
cial review.246
But regardless of the efforts to fix the FOIA, the primary issues—
abuse of the exceptions and the lack of genuine judicial review—per-
sist. The FOIA was intended to create a fundamental change in the
operation of government by tearing the “paper curtain” that separates
the people from the government. Because the balance of power has
shifted strongly in favor of the Executive, with “national security” be-
coming the ultimate catchall exception, the FOIA will continue to be
ineffective despite the new amendments.247
This is why a limited right to gather information under the First
Amendment is essential and indispensable. What is missing from cur-
rent jurisprudence is a limited newsgathering right embedded in the
structure of the Constitution as well as the First Amendment. With
this underpinning and a sincere commitment to allowing “uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open” public debate, perhaps judges would start to
look at litigation under the FOIA differently and utilize actual judicial
review to allow the polity the information necessary for self-
government.248
242. Id.
243. Ted Bridis, US Sets New Record for Censoring, Withholding Gov’t Files, AP NEWS




246. DAVID DADGE, CASUALTY OF WAR 276 (2004).
247. Barry Sullivan, FOIA and the First Amendment: Representative Democracy and
the People’s Elusive “Right to Know,” 72 MD. L. REV. 1, 21–22 (2012). Further,
Justice Stewart in N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), noted the
need to counter the “enormous power” of the Executive, which was “pressed to the
very hilt since the advent of the nuclear missile age.” He went on to argue that,
due to the lack of checks and balances against the increasingly powerful Execu-
tive, the only effective restraint “may lie in an enlightened citizenry . . . which
alone can here protect the values of democratic government.” Id. at 727–28.
248. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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IV. CONCLUSION
In the Supreme Court’s view, the Press Clause, as “mere Constitu-
tional window dressing,” has been interpreted as a redundancy of the
Speech Clause. However, as articulated in this Comment, the Press
Clause provides protection for the functional role any person fulfills by
writing and printing thoughts for public dissemination. When the
Press Clause is divorced from the Speech Clause and stands alone, the
purposes underlying the clause come into focus. The original purposes
of the clause included guarding against prior restraints, providing a
mechanism for self-government, and creating a check on misgovern-
ment. These functions create the foundation for a limited right to
gather information.
Furthermore, the Court has bifurcated the process of publication
into two distinct elements: gathering and publication. However, this
dichotomy is out of sync with the Court’s own precedent which indi-
cates that suppression may operate at different parts of the speech
process. Gathering is the necessary antecedent to publication—if you
suppress one, you suppress both. It is a sad state of affairs when the
nation that pioneered the concept of freedom of the press currently
ranks forty-fifth in the world for press freedom according to the World
Press Freedom Index.249 Removing barriers to information and pro-
tecting a limited right to gather information would go a long way to-
ward increasing press freedoms.
Ultimately, the dissemination of information is necessary for the
people to make informed decisions at the ballot box and to provide a
sufficient check on corruption. Without the free flow of information,
the freedom of the press as envisioned by the Framers will be forever
stifled. As James Madison wrote, “A popular Government, without
popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to
a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern
ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must
arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.”250
249. Trump Exacerbates Press Freedom’s Steady Decline, REPORTERS WITHOUT BOR-
DERS, https://rsf.org/en/united-states [https://perma.unl.edu/6B9F-P7FZ] (last vis-
ited Oct. 15, 2018).
250. 9 JAMES MADISON, Letter to W. T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
